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JUVENILE LAW - EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF JUVENILE CASES IN JUVENILE
COURTS
In J. W.A. v. State, I the Supreme Court of Georgia laid to rest a jurisdictional problem that had plagued the Georgia juvenile system for almost a
half of a century' when the court held that exclusive original jurisdiction
of non-capital juvenile cases is vested in the juvenile courts with concurrent jurisdiction of the superior courts becoming effective only when acti3
vated by a proper transfer from the juvenile courts.
A petition was filed for an adjudicatory hearing in the Juvenile Court of
White County.4 The petition alleged in part that the youth, 16 years of age,
was delinquent and in need of treatment because of his participation with
three adults in setting fire to a church located in White County.
The adjudicatory hearing was held before the superior court judge sitting
as judge of the juvenile court.5 After the hearing, the case was transferred
to the district attorney for presentation to the superior court. The youth
was subsequently indicted by the grand jury for arson.
An appeal was taken to the court of appeals6 on the ground that the
transfer was not a valid transfer under the law' and therefore the superior
court did not have jurisdiction over the case. The court of appeals, in
upholding the action of the lower court, stated that it was bound by previous court decisions' and held that the indictment by the grand jury
operated to divest the juvenile court of further jurisdiction over the case,
regardless of any deficiencies in the transfer.'
For almost 20 years the Georgia General Assembly had been trying by
statute to vest exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles in the juvenile courts.
This the legislature had attempted despite a constitutional provision
which explicitly conferred upon the superior courts "exclusive jurisdiction
. .in criminal cases where the offender is subjected to loss of life or
1. 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975).
2. See Henritze, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw: PersistingProblems of Georgia Juvenile
Court Practice,23 MERCER L. REV. 341 (1972).
3. 233 Ga. at 686, 212 S.E.2d at 851.
4. Petition was filed pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2201(a) (Supp. 1974).
5. This is allowed in some jurisdictions. See GA. CODE ANN. §24A-201 (Supp. 1974).
6. J.W.A. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 102, 210 S.E.2d 24 (1974).
7. There was evidence here that neither the juvenile nor his mother received notice of the
hearing as required by GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2501(a)(2) (Supp. 1974). See 133 Ga. App. at 105,
210 S.E.2d at 26 (dissenting opinion). For full requirements for transfer see note 25, infra.
8. 133 Ga. App. at 102, 210 S.E.2d at 24 (1975). The court was referring to J.E. v. State,
127 Ga. App. 589, 194 S.E.2d 288 (1972); and Mathis v. State, 231 Ga. 401, 202 S.E.2d 73
(1973).
9. 133 Ga. App. at 103, 210 S.E.2d at 25.
10. The 1951 Juvenile Court Act was the first legislative attempt to confer "exclusive
original" jurisdiction upon the juvenile courts. See Henritze, Annual Survey of Georgia Law:
Juvenile Law and the Juvenile Court System, 24 MERCER L. REV. 187 (1973).
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confinement in the penitentiary ....."" In the landmark decision of
Jackson v. Balkcom,11 the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
Jurisdiction to try persons charged with felonies, who are accountable
under the law, is fixed by the Constitution to be in the superior courts
. ..Should any of the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 have
been intended to withdraw the jurisdiction of the superior courts to try an
offender within the age of accountability under the law, for an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment .....
.such provisions would
be unconstitutional and could be given no effect."
Undaunted by Jackson, the legislature attempted, in the 1971 Georgia
Juvenile Code,' 4 to vest the juvenile courts with the same original and
exclusive jurisdictionas that declared unconstitutional in the 1951 Act in
Jackson. In again granting the same broad power to the juvenile courts,
the legislature clearly evidenced its intent to set up an entirely separate
judicial system for juveniles."5 Once again, however, the courts were constrained to point out that the Juvenile Code did not exist in a void, but
had to exist within the bounds set by the Georgia Constitution and the
Georgia Criminal Code.'" In J.E. v. State,17 the Georgia Supreme Court
held that "[niothing in the Juvenile Court Code or in the proceedings of
a juvenile court can abrogate [the superior court's jurisdiction] . ...
s
Finally, in 1972, the Georgia General Assembly initiated an amendment
to the Georgia Constitution'" which provided that the jurisdiction of the
superior courts over felony offenders was exclusive, "except in the case of
juvenile offenders as provided by law." 0 With this authority,' the legislature, in 1973, amended the Juvenile Court Code to state that "[tihe court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and shall be
the sole court for initiating action .... ,,12
11. GA. CONST. art. VI, §4, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-3901 (Rev. 1973).
12. 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954).
13. Id. at 414-15, 80 S.E.2d at 320-21.
14. Ga. Laws, 1971, p. 712; GA. CODE ANN. §24A-301 (Rev. 1971).
15. Henritze, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Persisting Problems of Georgia Juvenile
Court Practice,23 MERCER L. REV. 341 (1972).
16. GA. CODE ANN. §26-701 (Rev. 1972) sets 13 as the minimum age at which a child can
be held accountable for the commission of a crime.
17. 127 Ga. App. 589, 194 S.E.2d 288 (1972).
18. Id. at 590, 194 S.E.2d at 289.
19. Ga. Laws, 1972, p. 1544; GA. CODE ANN. §2-3901 (Rev. 1973).
20. Id.
21. The 1972 Constitutional Amendment did not change the law as it existed at that time.
In an opinion, the Georgia Attorney General stated that the amendment neither changed the
juvenile courts' jurisdiction nor revitalized the 1971 Juvenile Court Code. The amendment
simply allowed the legislature to alter the existing jurisdictional alignment. Op. GA. Arr'y
GEN. No. 72-179 (1972).
22. Ga. Laws, 1973, p. 882, 883; GA. CODE ANN. §24A-301(a) (Supp. 1974). There is an
exception in the case of capital felonies, in which the two courts still have concurrent jurisdic-
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However, uncertainty still haunted the system, caused primarily by the
decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Mathis v. State. 3 In that case,
delinquent acts of aggravated assault and armed robbery 4 were allegedly
committed by Mathis and others. The case was transferred to the superior
court pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. §24A-2501 (Supp. 1974).15 Deficiencies
in compliance with that section were the grounds argued on appeal. The
court in Mathis, relying on Jackson and J.E. v. State, restated the proposition that the superior court had constitutional jurisdiction to try a person
accused of a felony if he had reached the age of criminal responsibility.
Speaking through Justice Undercofler, the court pointed out that the 1972
constitutional amendment provided only that the superior court's jurisdiction over juveniles was not exclusive. 6
The majority of the court of appeals in J. W.A. v. State," in light of the
language used in Mathis and the date on which it was decided, 8 gave the
decision a liberal reading. 9 In writing the opinion of the court in J.WA.,
tion with all of its attendant problems. See GA. CODE ANN. §24A-301(b) (Supp. 1974). For an
excellent history of the Georgia Juvenile system and its problems, see Stubbs, The Juvenile
Court of 1968, 5 GA. ST. B.J. 219 (1968); Henritze, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Persisting
Problems of Georgia Juvenile Court Practice,23 MERCER L. REV. 341 (1972); Clark, The New
Juvenile Court Code of Georgia, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 409 (1971); and Henritze, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law: Juvenile Law and the Juvenile Court System, 24 MERCER L. REV. 187 (1974).
23. 231 Ga. 401, 202 S.E.2d 73 (1973).
24. Armed robbery is a capital felony. As such the superior court would have concurrent
jurisdiction over the case even under the present law. However, this point was not mentioned
in either the court of appeals or the supreme court opinion, probably because the first offense,
aggravated assault, is a non-capital felony. Mathis was construed by the court of appeals as
depriving the juvenile court of jurisdiction on both counts.
25. 231 Ga. 401, 202 S.E.2d 73 (1973). GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2501(a) (Supp. 1974) provides
that a juvenile court may transfer a case to another court if:
(1) a hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with
sections 24A-1801, 24A-2001, and 24A-2002; and
(2) notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to
the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days before
the hearing; and
(3) the court in its discretion determines there are reasonable grounds to believe
that (i) the child committed the delinquent act alleged, (ii) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through available facilities, (iii) the child is not
committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill, and (iv) the
interests of the child and the community require the child be placed under legal
restraint and the transfer should be made; and
(4) the child was at least 15 years of age at the time of the alleged delinquent
conduct or the child was 13 or 14 years of age and committed an act for which the
punishment is loss of life or confinement for life in the penitentiary.
26. 231 Ga. at 405, 202 S.E.2d at 77.
27. 133 Ga. App. 102, 210 S.E.2d 24 (1974). Judge Clark dissented.
28. The decision was handed down on November 9, 1973. The constitbtional amendment
became effective on January 1, 1973, and the statutory amendment to the juvenile code
became effective on April 17, 1973. However, see text accompanying note 38, infra.
29. One commentator felt that a strict reading of Mathis would cause no trouble:
Strictly construed, the Mathis case simply enunciates the state of the law prior to
the ratification of a constitutional amendment and subsequent implementing ac-

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Judge Quillian remarked that,
[iun construing the constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court (in
Mathis) pointed out that such amendment "only provides that the jurisdiction of the superior courts . . . is not exclusive ....
" The Act of 1973
.. . insofar as it might conflict with the 1972
Constitutional
Amendment
3
must yield to such paramount authority. 1
From this it appears that the court of appeals was of the impression that
the 1973 amendment to the juvenile code was not capable of giving the
juvenile courts exclusive originaljurisdiction over any type of case, capital
or non-capital. Therefore, once the superior court accepted jurisdiction
through the indictment, the juvenile court, which admittedly had had
jurisdiction, was divested of any further authority over the case. This
impression was certainly derived from the Mathis opinion.',
In J. W.A. v. State,3" the Georgia Supreme Court went directly to the
heart of the controversy. Realizing that the case did not turn upon the
validity of the transfer, 3 Justice Ingram, writing for the court, stated the
issue in the following manner: "Does an indictment of a juvenile for a
noncapital felony in the superior court oust the juvenile court of its first
' '3
obtained jurisdiction under the Georgia Constitution and statute law?
Although the supreme court recognized that the court of appeals had based
its decision primarily on Mathis, in reversing the court of appeals, the
court declined to overrule Mathis. Stating that in Mathis the court was
dealing "with the contention that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to try the juvenile for the offenses charged against him,",, the court
explained the holding of Mathis as it applied to the 1973 amendment:
We did not hold in Mathis that, under the 1972 Constitutional Amendment and 1973 legislation implementing it, an indictment automatically
ousts the previously acquired jurisdiction of a juvenile court. More importantly, we did not consider the 1973 legislation implementing the constitutional amendment because it was not briefed or argued in the case.36
The court stated that the true bill in Mathis was returned on December
18, 1972, and that therefore the case was correct under applicable law in
tion of the 1973 Georgia General Assembly. Liberally interpreted, the Mathis case
could be nothing short of disastrous for the juvenile justice system. McGough and
McGough, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Juvenile Law and the Juvenile Court
System, 26 MERCER L. REv. 129, 133 (1974).
30. 133 Ga. App. at 103-104, 210 S.E.2d at 25.
31. See the concurring opinion of Judge Deen and Judge Evans, 133 Ga. App. at 104-05;
210 S.E.2d at 25-26.
32. 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975).
33. Id. at 684, 212 S.E.2d at 850.
34. Id.
35. 233 Ga. at 685, 212 S.E.2d at 851.
36. Id.
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existence at that time." Herein lies the possible cause of the court of
appeals' confusion. At the time the indictment, or true bill, was handed
down by the grand jury, neither the constitutional amendment nor the
juvenile code amendment had become effective. However, before the case
was heard and a decision rendered, the juvenile code had been effectively
amended pursuant to the authority granted in the constitutional amendment.3 8 Therefore, although the court was required to take judicial notice
of all statutory law,"9 the law changing the juvenile code was not retroactive
and as such could not be applied to the Mathis case at the time it was
decided.
In reversing the court of appeals, the court completed at last the task of
establishing two separate ° court systems - one for juveniles and one for
adults. Although the 1972 Constitutional Amendment required statutory
implementation, once that implementation was accomplished through the
1973 amendment to the juvenile code, exclusive original jurisdiction of
non-capital cases was vested in the juvenile courts with the concurrent
jurisdiction of the superior courts becoming effective only when activated
by a valid transfer from the juvenile courts."
J. W.A. v. State provided the court with the opportunity to settle a
jurisdictional problem with which "[olur court system has suffered too
long . . . ."' Although the decision entailed little more than reading the
1972 Constitutional Amendment in conjunction with the statutory amendment passed in 1973, it was necessary in view of the misconceptions the
lower courts had acquired as a result of Mathis. As the court went to great
length to point out in J. W.A., Mathis was correct under the law as it
existed at that time. It is regrettable that the opinion in Mathis was such
as to leave the lower courts in doubt as to the reasons for the holding in
that case. J. W.A. v. State has clarified the Mathis ruling and the long
dispute over this type of shared jurisdiction should now be at an end.
JAMES 0.

WILSON, JR.

37. Id.
38. See note 28, supra.
39. GA. CODE ANN. §38-112 (Rev. 1973) requires the courts to take judicial notice of "the
laws of the United States and of the several States ..
"
40. The two systems are not entirely separate in view of the exception concerning capital
felonies where the two systems still share concurrent jurisdiction. See GA. CODE ANN. §24A301(a) (Supp. 1974).
41. 233 Ga. at 686, 212 S.E.2d 851-52.
42. Id. at 687, 212 S.E.2d at 852.

